



One Person, One Vote and the Ward Electoral System at the Local Level

Research and Working Paper No. 22

**by S. Drabek
1986**

The Institute of Urban Studies





THE UNIVERSITY OF
WINNIPEG

FOR INFORMATION:

The Institute of Urban Studies

The University of Winnipeg
599 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg
phone: 204.982.1140
fax: 204.943.4695
general email: ius@uwinnipeg.ca

Mailing Address:

The Institute of Urban Studies

The University of Winnipeg
515 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9

ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE WARD ELECTORAL SYSTEM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Research and Working Paper No. 22

Published 1986 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg

© THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES

Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.

The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change.

ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
AND THE WARD ELECTORAL SYSTEM
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Research and Working Paper No. 22

by

S. Drabek

Institute of Urban Studies
1986

PUBLICATION DATA

Drakek, S., One person, one vote and the
ward electoral system at the local level

(Research and working papers; 22)

ISEN: 0-920213-23-5

1. Government - municipal - Canada. I. University
of Winnipeg. Institute of Urban Studies.
II. Title. III. Series: Research and
Working Papers (Institute of Urban Studies.
University of Winnipeg.); 22.

This publication was partially supported by the Canada Mortgage
and Housing Corporation, but the views expressed are the personal
views of the author and the corporation accepts no responsibility
for them.

PREFACE

The University of Winnipeg was the location of a major national urban studies conference, hosted by the Institute of Urban Studies in August 1985. The "Canadian Urban Studies Conference" addressed the general theme of "The Canadian Urban Experience - Past and Present." More than ninety specialists spoke during forty separate sessions on such topics as housing and the built environment, economic and community development, planning and urban form, women and the urban environment, and urban government and politics.

This publication is a result of the Canadian Urban Studies Conference. The Institute of Urban Studies is publishing many of the papers presented at the conference in the Institute's publication series. Some of the papers will also appear in the scholarly journal, the Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine and in book form.

This conference represented a major effort on the part of the Institute of Urban studies in terms of fulfilling its role as a national centre of excellence in the urban studies and housing fields.

Alan F.J. Artibise
Director



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	iii
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	vi
<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
2.0 IFS, ANDS, BUTS AND HOWEVERS	2
3.0 WARDS AND WARD COUNCILLORS	4
4.0 ONE PERSON ONE VOTE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL	8
5.0 LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRICTING CRITERIA	12
6.0 ROLE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS	14
7.0 CONCLUSION	17
NOTES	19

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Population Figures	2
2. Total Number of Ward Council Members	4
3. Population and Ward Council Representation, 1961-1971	5
4. Population and Ward Council Representation, 1971-1985	5
5. Total Number of Wards	6
6. Increase/Decrease in Ward Councillors, 1961-1985	7
7. Analysis of Changes Made in the Ward Systems of Selected Cities	12

...[F]or the electoral system profoundly affects the character of politics. It should not be surprising, then, that efforts to change fundamentally the distribution of power within a city are often directed toward changing the electoral system.¹

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Representative government has long been a focus of academic study. Numerous articles and books have dealt with this topic philosophically and specifically as well as its application through the electoral process at the Canadian federal and provincial levels.² The literature, in general, has stressed the discussion of such themes as delegate vs. trustee, the ideas of accountability and responsiveness, the mechanics of the electoral process, and more recently, one specific aspect of representation by population - the idea of one person, one vote.

In the Canadian literature on local government several authors have analyzed in more detail some of these topics. Higgins, for example, in his book Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics indicates that the size of council may be dictated by whether the service or representation function of council is considered to be more important.³ He also discusses the nature of wards and how this affects the nature of local elections.⁴ Crawford in his book Canadian Municipal Government,⁵ had a section on "The Basis of Elections." In their book The Management of Canadian Urban Government,⁶ T.J. Plunkett and G.M. Betts, devote a section to "Representation in Local Government" and specifically to the question of representativeness.⁷ Finally Lorimer's excellent case study of the change in the Toronto ward system serves as a guidepost in any study of this area.⁸

This paper is one attempt to answer the question raised by Plunkett and Betts whether existing municipal institutions in Canada allow for the best representation and representativeness. It does so by analyzing and comparing the ward systems of several of Canada's larger cities over a period of twenty-five years. The specific points of analysis include numerical data on the number of wards, number of councillors; the analytical application of one person, one vote to these figures; the procedures used to determine the nature of representation; and a section on the role of the provincial government in

the process.

2.0 IFS, AND, BUTS AND HOWEVERS

Any comparative analysis of the electoral systems of Canadian cities is made difficult by the differences in historical, political and economic development, population size and the constitutional role of provincial governments. Consequently this section sets out all the caveats that must be made in a study of this kind.

The chosen cities (Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Halifax) reflect the regional nature of Canada; an opportunity to compare cities in a specific province (Toronto, Ottawa, and Hamilton in Ontario) and the desire to take advantage of the wealth of data on cities such as Winnipeg and Toronto. It must also be noted that the units to be analyzed are cities (i.e. Toronto) and not the statistical metropolitan areas (i.e. Metropolitan Toronto). Table 1 indicates the population of the cities included in our sample.⁹

TABLE 1
Population Figures

Year	1961	1971	1981
<u>Cities</u>			
Calgary	249,641	403,319	592,743
Edmonton	281,027	438,152	532,246
Winnipeg	265,429	246,246	564,473
Toronto	672,407	712,786	599,217
Ottawa	268,206	302,341	295,163
Hamilton	273,991	309,173	306,434
Montreal	1,191,062	1,214,352	980,354
Halifax	92,511	122,035	114,594

Source: Statistics Canada

Our second point concerns the time period under analysis. Higgins in a review article for City Magazine discussing power at city hall stated:

The decade of the late sixties and early seventies is thought to have witnessed the flowering of a new reform movement in city politics....¹⁰

One of the strategies of this new reform movement was to change the electoral system in ways which facilitated "representativeness" that is better representation of neighbourhoods and minority groups and more equal representation.

Two other factors, no doubt, influenced the reform movement and these goals. The first was the 1964 United States Supreme Court decision in Baker vs. Carr dealing with instances of inequalities in the population of electoral districts and the involvement of the courts to correct these inequalities. Secondly and almost simultaneously in Canada, the passage of the federal government's 1964 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act which created independent commissions for the task of redistricting constituencies and which also strove for more equal representation amongst constituencies.

Therefore the decision was made to begin the analysis with those years immediately before the above-mentioned 1964 date to serve as a basis for comparison for any later changes. Consequently the year 1961 was chosen as the starting point of the study.

The third point concerns matters of terminology. Council membership usually includes the mayor and historically in some cases in Ontario, members of the Board of Control who were elected at large. Since the main focus of this paper is on the electoral process and wards, there was a question of whether alderman, ward representative or ward councillor would be the most appropriate terms. "Ward councillor" is the term used here.

Finally this paper, because of space and time limitations, does not cover the relationship between changes in the representational structure of local

government and the emergence of a local party system as well as the issue of residency requirements for ward elections.

3.0 WARDS AND WARD COUNCILLORS

Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide data about the electoral ward systems of the selected cities during the 1961-1985 time periods. They list the total number of ward councillors at the beginning and end of the time period as well as the number of wards.

TABLE 2

Total Number of Ward Council Members

Year	1961	1985
Cities		
Calgary	12	14
Edmonton	--	12
Winnipeg	18	29
Toronto	18	22
Montreal	66	57
Hamilton	16	16
Ottawa	20	15
Halifax	14	12

An analysis of these tables provides some interesting information. In spite of the reform movements at the local level and the strong emphasis on citizen participation and representation, the data in place in 1985 shows that the total number of ward councillors for the selected cities has gone down in the interval since 1961 (a decrease of nine councillors).

TABLE 3

Population and Ward Council Representation, 1961-1971

Cities	Population Increase/ (Decrease)	Number of Ward Councillors Increase/ (Decrease)
Edmonton	157,125	-- (a)
Winnipeg	(19,183)	32 (b)
Toronto	40,379	4
Ottawa	34,135	--
Hamilton	35,182	--
Montreal	23,290	(14)
Halifax	29,524	(4)
Calgary	153,678	--

NOTES: (a) Edmonton change from 12 at large members to 4 wards with 3 representatives per ward.

(b) Change to Unicity concept.

TABLE 4

Population and Ward Council Representation, 1971-1985

Cities	Population Increase/ (Decrease)	Number of Ward Councillors Increase/ (Decrease) (1971-1985)
Edmonton	94,094 (a)	--
Winnipeg	318,227 (b)	(21)
Toronto	(113,569)	--
Ottawa	(7,178)	(5)
Hamilton	(2,739)	--
Montreal	(233,098)	5
Halifax	(7,441)	2
Calgary	189,424	2

NOTES: (a) Edmonton no change in the total number but a change from 4 wards with 3 representatives per ward to six wards with 2 representatives per ward.

(b) Unicity population.

In this respect, however, one should note the data provided in Tables 3 and 4 which break down the period under review into the 1961-1971 and 1971-1985 time periods. During the first period (Table 3) because of the creation of Unicity, Winnipeg had a dramatic increase in the number of representatives - a relatively high number of thirty-two. On the other hand, both Halifax and Montreal decreased the number of representatives, (a decrease of fourteen in the latter case).

Table 4 covering a later time period, also indicates a mixed picture. The increase in ward councillors in Montreal, Halifax and Calgary is more than offset by the decreases in Ottawa and especially Winnipeg (a total of twenty-one).¹¹

Table 5 which illustrates the total number of wards, provides some interesting information: over-all there has been a substantial increase in the total number of wards.¹² These increases have occurred in six of the eight cities under review; Edmonton and Hamilton are the exceptions.

TABLE 5

Total Number of Wards

Year	1961	1985
Cities		
Calgary	6	14
Edmonton	--	6
Winnipeg	3	29
Toronto	9	11
Montreal	11	57
Hamilton	8	8
Ottawa	10	15
Halifax	7	12

Another interesting fact comes to light when comparing Table 2 and Table 5. This is the dramatic movement from multi-member wards to single member wards during the period. In 1961 the cities with ward systems¹³ all had multi-member wards (usually two), while Montreal and Winnipeg, the exceptions, had

six per ward. Presently, only Edmonton, Hamilton and Toronto have multi-member wards (two per ward).

It appears that in response to current pressures, local government electoral structural reform concentrated on creating single member wards rather than on substantially increasing the number of representatives.¹⁴ This movement, it was felt, would enhance "representativeness" and its companion ideas of accountability and responsiveness.

TABLE 6

Population and Ward Council Representation

Cities	Population (Decrease)/Increase (1961-1981)	Number of Ward Councillors Increase/(Decrease) (1961-1985)
Edmonton	251,219	--
Winnipeg	299,044 (a)	11 (a)
Toronto	(73,190)	4
Ottawa	26,957	(5)
Hamilton	32,443	--
Montreal	(210,708)	(9)
Halifax	22,083	(2)
Calgary	343,102	2

NOTES: (a) Unification of Metro area into Winnipeg Unicity.

Population alone does not appear to be the most important factor in determining whether there will be an increase or a decrease in the number of elected representatives. Table 6, which sets out the relevant data on the issue, presents a mixed picture. Calgary, the city with the largest population increase added just two more ward councillors. And Edmonton, a city in the same province and with the third largest population increase, maintained the status quo. (Winnipeg's Unicity must be considered separately). Yet Ottawa, which had a slight population increase decreased the number of representatives, and Toronto which experienced a decrease in population, added four new representatives.

Six of the selected cities showed population increases. In terms of representation, two of these cities (Hamilton, Edmonton) show no change; two cities (Winnipeg, Calgary) added more representatives while two others (Ottawa and Halifax) decreased the numbers of ward councillors. However, it should be noted that in the latter instance, Ottawa and Halifax while decreasing ward councillors, also moved from multi-member to single representative type wards. At the same time the two cities with increased population but no change in representation, maintained their multi-member wards. There seem to be different and conflicting approaches as to what constitutes a better method of encompassing the goals of representativeness, responsiveness and accountability.

4.0 ONE PERSON ONE VOTE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

This paper now proceeds to the heart of the paper's analysis - one person one vote. Completely comparable statistics are not available in all instances for a thorough year by year study. Yet enough data is available to allow for general statements to be made on the ideal for one person, one vote.¹⁵

Part of the problem stems from the representational population/electors dichotomy and the basic question that this dichotomy contains. The rallying cry has always been representation by population. But the question remains whether it should not be rephrased to representation by the number of eligible voters?

At the senior levels both redistribution and redistricting are done on the basis of population and variances between rural and urban constituencies are also based on numbers of people. Things are not so clear cut at the local level. While there are sets of statistics which show the total population of wards, cities also enumerate the number of voters in these same wards. However, this is usually done during the time period preceding the civic elections.

Analysis in this area has progressed from a table included in K. Grant Crawford's book in 1954:¹⁶

<u>Ward Population</u>	<u>Highest</u>	<u>Lowest</u>
Toronto	115,914	48,011
Winnipeg	79,317	75,309

Beyond this table there was little comment.

Given the above-mentioned population/electors dichotomy, this analysis will concentrate more on the wide ranging statistics available for cities during the past few years. Nevertheless some historical connecting points with the present can be made. For example when Halifax annexed some surrounding territory in the 1960s and the process of ward redistribution and redistricting occurred, the basis for the latter was a population of 6,800 for each ward.¹⁷ In the 1970s, Ottawa's wards were based on population figures which varied widely from a ward low of 16,826 to a high of 49,839.¹⁸

What do the 1980s show with respect to cities, wards and one person, one vote? Part of the answer rests with the criteria developed by cities including "natural boundaries" to redistrict ward boundaries. The other part is the analysis of each relevant city's population and voter statistics. The description will proceed from east to west - Halifax to Calgary.

Halifax bases its redistricting on eligible voters. They range from a 1982 low of 6,260 in Ward 6 to a high of 8,487 in Ward 1.¹⁹ The average (mean) number of eligible voters is 7,063 and this in turn indicates that the absolute deviations from the mean number for the lowest number of eligible voters is approximately 10% while it is a variation of 20% for the ward with the highest number of eligible voters.

Montreal's wards are based on guidelines established by the provincial government and they too are based on eligible voters. Some data was found on proposed Montreal wards for the 1982 election.²⁰ They range from a low of 10,627 eligible voters in a ward area near Outremont, to a high of 14,436 in

north-end Ahuntsic. Both figures are within the provincial deviation rule guidelines.

Ottawa's wards are based on population with a 5% differential.²¹ Its 1984 population figures show a range from a low of 15,973 to a high of 27,408. Figures for the 1982 civic election show the number of eligible voters range from a low of 12,549 in Elmdale ward to a high of 19,377 in Rideau.²² The mean population per ward is 20,336 while the mean number for electors is 15,638.

All of the above figures translate into deviances of +34% and -21% for population statistics and approximately plus and minus 20% for the eligible voter statistics.

City of Toronto Handbooks, when published, usually listed population figures for each of the city's wards. However, the city of Toronto's only undertaking in this area, is to study in detail the number of eligible voters in each ward during election years. The last previous election in Toronto was in 1982. Figures for that year show the lowest number of eligible voters to be 25,778 in Ward 4, while highest is 55,181 in Ward 6.²³ Further extensions of these figures indicate a mean figure of 40,216 and the deviation percentages ranging from a plus 37% to a minus 32%.

Population dictates the size of Hamilton's wards. We find that 1985 figures show that its wards range from a low of 32,141 in Ward 2 to a high of 54,179 in Ward 5.²⁴ This creates a mean population average of 34,651 and in turn the mean population percentage deviances range from a plus 55 per cent to a minus 1 per cent.²⁵

Moving west, Winnipeg's wards are also determined by population. The provincial legislation creating "Unicity" specified that the size of the wards had to be, wherever possible, in the 10,000 to 12,000 range. However, this balance was upset when further provincial legislation reduced the size of the council to 29 which caused a rise in ward population sizes. The mean average per constituency or representative was 10,630 in 1971.²⁶ Over the years this

has increased to a mean average of 19,823.²⁷

A further examination of population figures in Winnipeg produces additional interesting facts. Based on 1981 population figures for the six designated communities we find that the average size for the wards in the communities vary from a low of 17,947 in St. James-Assiniboina Community to the high of 22,605 in St. Boniface-St. Vital Community. The mean average is 20,400.²⁸

According to Masson,²⁹ there are an average of 93,300 people in Edmonton's six wards based on the 1983 civic census figures. That census also indicates a ward population range from a low of 82,916 to a high of 112,615,³⁰ while the number of electors ranges from a low of 59,885 to a high of 73,786. Since there are two representatives per ward, the above figures translate into an average population of 46,450 and 31,837 electors for each representative.

Further analysis using the factor of deviation from the mean, results in deviations ranging from -5.9% to +9.4% on the basis of population and -4.7% to 15.0% in terms of electors.

Calgary's wards are based on population even though section 28 of the Municipal Government Act refers to "electors." According to the 1985 civic census, the population of Calgary's wards runs from a low of 29,448 to a high of 56,618 in the fast-growing Northeast section of the city. The mean average of ward population in 1985 is 44,652.³¹ These same figures also provide the number of estimated voters per ward and they range from a low of 21,203 to a high of 32,736.³²

All of the above data indicates that statistically there is no discernible pattern in the analysis of average ward populations, average number of electors per ward and deviations from the mean. Perhaps this is too much to expect given the different histories, political environment and population compositions of the chosen cities. One notes, however, that provincial government involvement (Manitoba and Quebec) does produce "guidelines" for the above factors of analysis. Yet even here, these guidelines raise another set of analytical questions in terms of why a particular statistical figure was

chosen.

5.0 LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRICTING CRITERIA

Unlike redistribution and redistricting at the federal level these are not set rules - either in terms of specific time periods or criteria for doing these at the local level. In this respect the cities are more akin to their own senior partners - the provinces. Table 7 indicates the changes made in the respective cities during the period under review.

TABLE 7

Analysis of Changes Made in the
Ward Systems of Selected Cities

<u>Type</u>	<u>Description</u>
A.	<u>Increase</u> in the number of wards. (This would also include the necessary changes in the populations and boundaries of wards.)
B.	<u>Decrease</u> in the number of wards. (This would also include the necessary changes in the populations and boundaries of wards.)
C.	<u>Changes</u> in populations and boundaries of wards <u>only</u> .
D.	Change in the nature of wards (i.e. block, strip, neighbourhood.)
E.	Change in the number of representatives per ward.

<u>City</u>	<u>Year, Type</u>
Calgary	1968 C
	1977 A, E
	1983 C
Edmonton	1980 D, C, E
Winnipeg	1971 A, D, E (Unicity)
	1974 C
	1977 B
Toronto	1969 A, D
Ottawa	1966 A
	1972 B
	1979 A (1)

TABLE 7 CONTINUED

<u>City</u>	<u>Year, Type</u>
Hamilton	1970 C
	1980 C
Montreal	1961 B
	1963 A (2)
	1964 A (2)
	1968 A
	1973 A
	1978 C
	1981-82 A (2)
Halifax	1968 B, E
	1980 A

- (1) Increase in size due to addition of Board of Control.
 (2) Increase in size due to annexation.

An overview of the changes produces few common threads. The number of changes ranges from a high of seven in Montreal to lows of one in both Toronto and Edmonton.

A variety of reasons appear to explain the ward redistributions and redistrictings. Among the common reasons are the usual ones dealing with the desire for more equitable representation and the increases in the population of most cities. Other important reasons are provincial government legislation and directives (Winnipeg), annexations (Montreal) and changes from multi-member to single member wards (Halifax).

One interesting reason stems from changes made in Ottawa and Toronto. In both instances—the 1969 change in Toronto and the 1979 change in Ottawa — the initiating issue was the abolition of the Board of Control. This in turn created representational problems for the city of Toronto on the Metropolitan Toronto Council and Ottawa on the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton Council.

Both cities used the same technique to solve these representational problems. The dissolution of the four member Boards of Control meant that in

each case, the cities had four new vacancies. How to fill them? Create additional wards with enough representation to fill the vacancies. In Toronto's case this meant two new wards combined with the traditional system of two member wards, while in Ottawa's case the council decided to create four additional wards. Lorimer's statement about "making city politics safe for the aldermen" which he applied to Toronto, would also seem applicable to Ottawa.

When the matter of redistricting alone emerged, the criteria used by the cities were, more or less, the same. Perhaps the criteria used by the City of Halifax provides, an indicative list. They are:

- 1) equitable distribution of voting population,
- 2) natural boundaries, geography and neighbourhood limits,
- 3) established and historical groupings, ³³
- 4) areas of anticipated population growth.

Other criteria may be found, such as the more conservative Calgary approach to redistricting in 1968 which indicated that the availability of polling locations must be taken into account as well as making sure that there were as few changes as possible from the previous boundaries.

One interesting criterion is used by Ottawa. This redistricting process used population as a basis but interestingly enough with a 5% differential when the number of wards was increased from eleven to fifteen. ³⁴

Perhaps the most interesting criterion (or reason with whatever adjective one wants to apply) was that advanced by a representative of the City of Hamilton:

The ward boundaries were changed to make the population in each ward more equitable and thereby helping to ensure a more equitable workload for the alderman. ³⁵

6.0 ROLE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

This section deals with the role of provincial governments in the various local electoral systems. Provincial constitutional powers over municipalities

derive from Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act and each province uses these powers differently depending on the subject area.

In dealing with local government electoral systems, provincial intervention can be categorized as being direct (Winnipeg, Montreal), active (Halifax, Toronto) or passive (Calgary). Direct intervention occurs where there are specific pieces of provincial legislation dealing with a city (i.e. the City of Winnipeg Act in Manitoba and the Charter of the City of Montreal in Quebec). The intervention process is somewhat intensified when the party in power provincially is somewhat radical or left of centre such as the NDP in Manitoba and the Parti Québécois. In both provinces, these parties felt that the electoral system in the specific cities could be more representative.

In a recent study, the City of Winnipeg Act is described as specifying

...every aspect of the political organization of the city - the boundaries of wards and their number, their organization into communities and the committees of council, the executive level of the civic administration³⁶ and generally prescribe the powers and authorities of each.

The original 1971 Act prescribed, among other things, the total number of councillors (50) in Sec.9 (1), the criteria in determining the wards Sec.5(6), the number of councillors per ward Sec.9(2) and under Sec.6(2) the stipulation that the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council will alter ward boundaries. It also specified a time period after which a review process would be set in motion. With modifications, the same structures apply presently.

In enacting the 1971 Act, the NDP government of the day felt that it was representing political minorities who would gain more political clout from the creation of Winnipeg Unicity. Moreover, this would be ensured by detailed legislation establishing a ward system with a large representative council of 50 members and the consequent small number of people per ward representative. Over the years, however, the same NDP government has decreased the number of councillors. It was believed that this smaller council would be more manageable than its predecessor.³⁷ However, this did mean an increase in population per ward representative. No doubt, the report of the new Review

Committee on the City of Winnipeg Act will create considerable interest.

Similarly, the governments of Quebec have involved themselves directly in the electoral system of the city of Montreal. A number of changes were made by the provincial governments to the Council numbers and wards through sections in the Charter of the City of Montreal in the 1960s. The most "interventionist" phase occurred with the Parti Québécois in power in 1978. At that time, the provincial government initiated changes in the electoral system which they felt would "democratize" Montreal.

Among the most important provisions enacted by the Parti Québécois (PQ) government was the provision to specify the number of councillors in a city with over one million to a number no less than 48. In the case of Montreal, the PQ felt that there should be at least 50 single member wards and later increased the number to 54. Another section of the Act³⁸ provided for a 15% quotient when determining the size and boundaries of districts (wards) in terms of voters.

The latter quotient, still in effect, created a mean average number of 12,500 voters in each district. By breaking down the older, larger districts, it was hoped to get more representation of Montreal's different groups while at the same time undercutting Mayor Jean Drapeau's iron grip on City Hall.

Our second category we have called "active intervention." In this instance, it is not the government itself but a quasi-judicial arm of the government which is most involved in the decision-making process. For example, in Ontario, it is the Ontario Municipal Board while in Nova Scotia, it was the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities and now is the Nova Scotia Municipal Board. These bodies have the power of approval over many items including changes in ward numbers and boundaries. Higgins make the claim that:

Municipalities no longer have as much control or discretion as they once had over...the delineation of ward/district boundaries for electoral purposes, or the size of council....³⁹

Under Ontario legislation, the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) has the responsibility to divide a city into wards as well as naming and numbering the wards. Lorimer's case study on the 1969 Toronto ward change issue before the Board is an excellent example of "active" provincial participation. The issue was not the number of wards but the type (block vs. strip) of wards. In the original proposal, the city maintained the original strip plan but also forwarded a map for the eleven wards based on block wards. The Board to the astonishment of Toronto decided on the block ward plan since it provided for more representativeness.⁴⁰

On the other hand, the required hearings on changes in the ward systems of Ottawa and Hamilton over the years caused little controversy and the OMB allowed the proposed changes as put forth by the respective cities.

Alberta's provincial government is the example of the third category - passive intervention. Under this category, the province establishes the guidelines which allow the city to establish the ward electoral system it wants within these guidelines. Section 27 of the Alberta Municipal Government Act indicates that there are to be no more than 20 councillors and Section 28 provides that the number of electors (my emphasis) in each ward be substantially equal (my emphasis) and each ward must have the same number of representatives. Beyond these specifics, the cities of Edmonton and Calgary can redistribute and redistrict as the political will moves them.

7.0 CONCLUSION

One person, one vote is still a goal at the local government. Yet slow but steady progress has been made. More active citizen involvement in a variety of political areas has provided an impetus to achieve a more balanced representative system.

The very fact that there are more instances of redistribution and redistricting is but one example of this progress. Another is the movement from large multi-member to small single member constituencies which allow for

more accountability and responsiveness.

Progress has been made to be sure, but many large cities face the problem of overcoming the inner city - suburban population movements in terms of an adequate system of representation. While the suburban areas grow dramatically in population terms, their numbers of eligible voters grows more slowly. On the other hand, most of the population in the inner city are eligible voters.

Taking a cue from their senior partners, the cities when establishing a representational system make use of a deviation plan which permits variances among the various city wards in respect of population figures. Consequently the most important unit of analysis for local government electoral system is the number of eligible voters.

There is one, more or less, guaranteed way of achieving one person, one vote and that is through direct provincial government intervention. This means a specific piece of legislation (be it a City Charter or an Electoral System Act) providing a determined number of wards, types of wards and an average number of eligible electors per ward. But even here the results are mixed, since the provincial government must take political factors into account.

Given the continuing demand for citizen involvement, the emphasis on more electoral accountability, representativeness and the changing structures of local government, the next few years will be very interesting to students of Canadian local government electoral systems.

NOTES

1. E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1983), 87.
2. A good basic list of books and articles on the topic is to be found in P. Fox, ed., Politics: Canada, 5th edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1982).
3. D. Higgins, Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), 99.
4. Ibid., 251-52.
5. K.G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 77, passim.
6. T.J. Plunkett and G.M. Betts, The Management of Canadian Urban Government (Kingston, Ontario: The Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1978), 131.
7. Ibid., 136.
8. James Lorimer, "Ward Boundaries: Making City Politics Safe for City Politicians," in The Real World of City Politics (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1970) 37-52.
9. It should be noted that the use of these terms--cities and statistical metropolitan areas--does create problems. The city of Calgary is also, for intents and purposes, the statistical metropolitan census unit.
10. Donald Higgins, "Progressive City Politics and the Citizen Movement: A Status Report," City Magazine Annual Vol. 5,1: 84.
11. The Manitoba provincial government (the NDP in both cases) plays an important role in the large increases and decreases in Winnipeg's civic electoral representation.
12. Once again the increase would have been even more substantial had Winnipeg retained its high point of 50 wards.
13. Even Edmonton when it instituted a ward system of representation, started with four wards and three ward councillors from each ward.
14. Edmonton contributed to this process by cutting back on the number of ward councillors from three to two per ward in 1980.
15. For this reason, the author has decided on a descriptive written version in this section rather than one which would have combined the written with a series of tables.

16. K. Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), 85.
17. Letter to the author from R.H. Stoddard, City Clerk, Halifax, 8 February 1974.
18. Letter to the author from R. Conlin, Administrative Officer, City of Ottawa, 12 February 1974. It should be noted that in this particular instance additional data on voters is available for comparison in A. Bernard, Leveille, and G. Lord, Profile: Ottawa-Hull (Ottawa: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1974), 10. The comparable statistics show the lowest number of electors in Wellington ward of 14,704 to a high of 22,804 in Rideau ward. The average number of electors per ward was 18,651 with the percentage deviances being 22% above and 21% below.
19. Figures submitted in a letter to the author from G.I. Blennerhassett, City Clerk, Halifax, 17 June 1985.
20. Montreal Gazette, 25 May 1981.
21. Figures submitted in a letter to the author from R. Conlin, Electoral Officer, City of Ottawa, 18 June 1985.
22. Ibid.
23. Toronto City Clerk's Office, City of Toronto, Summary of Municipal Elections, 8 November 1982.
24. Figures provided in a letter to the author from S.G. Hollowell, Records Administrator, City Clerk's Office, City of Hamilton, 18 June 1985.
25. An earlier study of Hamilton's voter participation in the 1976 civic election includes ward population and eligible voter figures. See Barbara Tisdall, Voter Participation in Hamilton (Hamilton and District: Social Planning and Research Council, April 1978).
26. City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee, Our City in Review: Issues Paper (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1984), 23.
27. Ibid. This review has ward sizes as one area of concern and will be reporting in 1986 with recommendations.
28. Based on figures in the City of Winnipeg Municipal Manual, 1984.
29. J. Masson, Albert's Local Governments and Their Politics (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985), 318.
30. Population and elector figures provided in a letter to the author from C.J. McGonigle City Clerk of Edmonton, 11 September 1985.
31. Figures on population and estimated electors provided by the City Clerk's Office City of Calgary, 9 September 1985.

32. An interesting aspect of the figures on estimated voters concerns Ward 5 one of the more populous wards and located in the Northeast section of the city. An analysis of the eligible voters indicates that only 55% of the population can vote indicating a good example of a suburban ward with a young population.
33. Letter, 17 June 1985.
34. Letter 18 June 1985.
35. Letter, 18 June 1985.
36. City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee, Our City in Review, 21.
37. Matthew J. Kiernan and David C. Walker, "Winnipeg" in City Politics in Canada, ed. W. Magnusson and A. Sancton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 252.
38. Loi concernant les elections de 1978 dans certains municipalities et modifiant la Loi des cites et des villes Sec. 10(5) and Sec.11.
39. D. Higgins, "Approaches to Local Government Reorganization: Nova Scotia" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association Vancouver, June 1983), 16.
40. Ontario Municipal Board, Decision of the OMB re Ward Boundaries in the City of Toronto, 3 July 1969. One wonders what would have happened had the City of Toronto not submitted the map showing the city divided into block wards.

IUS PUBLICATIONS

REPORTS

The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approaches and Interpretations, Report No. 4, by A.F.J. Artibise and P.-A. Linteau.

Housing Canada's Seniors, Report No. 14, by S. Goldblatt, F. Cates and J. Phillips.

Public Transit and the Public Interest: An Empirical Evaluation of Two Administrative Models, Report No. 15, by F. Frisken.

Community Economic Development: An Approach for Urban-Based Economies, Report No. 16, by L. Newman, D. Lyon and W. Philp.

RESEARCH AND WORKING PAPERS

Canadian Towns and Villages: An Economic Profile, 1981, Research and Working Paper No. 14, by M. Qadeer and K. Chinnery.

The Neighbourhood Improvement Program, 1973-1983: A National Review of an Intergovernmental Initiative, Research and Working Paper No. 15, by D. Lyon and L. Newman.

Housing Subsidies in a Period of Restraint: The Canadian Experience, 1973-1984, Research and Working Paper No. 16, by J.D. Hulchanski and G. Drover.

The Expenditure Budget Process in Canadian Municipalities: A Comparison, Research and Working Paper No. 18, by D. Amborski.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Federal Housing Policies in the 1980s/La politique federale de l'habitation des annees 1980, Occasional Paper No. 12, by The Honourable William McKnight.

Municipal Non-Profit Housing: Winnipeg Housing Rehabilitation Corporation, Occasional Paper Nods. 13, by L. Newman.

Cities in the 21st Century, Occasional Paper No. 14, by G. Gappert.

Main Street Canada: Urban Conservation in Small Town Downtown, Occasional Paper No. 15, by G. Fulton.

URBAN RESOURCES SERIES

The Windsor Municipal Archives: Heritage Development in Hard Times, Urban Resources Series No. 1, by M. Walsh.

A complete listing of IUS Publications is available on request. For more information, contact:

INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES
University of Winnipeg
515 Portage Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3B 3E9 CANADA